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RETHINKING DISCLOSURE LIABILITY IN THE
MODERN ERA
MERRITT B. FOX*
The state of issuer disclosure in 1997 is like the proverbial half-filled
glass. On one hand, as Dean Seligman has amply demonstrated in his
contribution to this symposium,' the glass is half empty in the sense that the
legal incentives for established issuers to engage in high quality disclosure at
the time that they sell new securities have decreased in recent decades. Due to
the more liberal exemptions available under Regulation S, Rule 144A,
Regulation D and Regulation A, a much smaller portion of such sales is even
subject to the formal disclosure oriented registration process under Section 5
of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act").2 For the portion that is,
the resulting amount of disclosure has been reduced in many cases because
short form and shelf registration has weakened underwriter due diligence.3
On the other hand, the glass is half full in the sense that some of these
same reforms have improved the quality of disclosure at times when such
issuers are not selling new securities. Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), publicly traded issuers are required to file
periodic disclosure reports with the SEC-10-K's, 10-Q's and 8-K's-
whether or not they are selling new securities. Traditionally, before short
* University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Ph.D. (Economics) 1980, Yale.
Financial support for this project as provided by the Cook Fund of the University of Michigan.
1. Joel Seligman, Gdtterdfimmerung for the Securities Act?, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 887, 889-96
(1997).
2. Id. at 890-96. The disclosure, if any, that does accompany these sales is also not subject to
the strict liability provisions of Securities Act section 11.
3. Underwriter due diligence is the underwriter's investigation into the truthfulness and
completeness of a registration statement conducted in order to be able to establish an affirmative
defense if an action against it for damages under Section 11 of the Securities Act should subsequently
arise. The weakening occurs under the reforms because of, among other things, the greatly abbreviated
period between when an issuer indicates its intent to make an offering and the time the offering
commences. See Report of The Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Process
pt. 4, at 53-66 (SEC 1996) [hereinafter Wallman Report] (separate statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Edward F. Greene, and Lawrence W. Sonsini); Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated
Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1025-28
(1984). For other commentators who agree that the reforms will reduce underwriter due diligence, but
who are less impressed by its value, see Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets,
and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984); David M. Green, Due
Diligence Under Rule 415: Is the Insurance Worth the Premium?, 38 EMORY L.J. 793 (1989). These
commentators, however, do not consider the value of issuer disclosure discussed infra in Part 1.
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form and shelf registration, issuers provided much lower quality disclosure in
these periodic filings than in their section 5 Securities Act registration
statements. Although both sets of documents were supposed to answer
essentially the same questions, the periodic filings provided lower quality
disclosure because they were subject to a less severe liability regime4 and
were not given a due diligence review by an investment bank.' Today, issuers
have an incentive to improve the quality of their periodic filings. Improved
quality puts an issuer in a better position to utilize short form registration and
shelf registration should it decide subsequently to sell new securities. The
attraction of each of these reforms is based on the ability it gives an issuer to
incorporate by reference disclosures set out in its Exchange Act filings. This
would be of no use to an issuer with low quality periodic filings because
material incorporated by reference in this fashion is subject to the much
stricter Securities Act liability regime.' These new incentives, however, take
us only halfway. For a variety of reasons, an issuer preparing a periodic filing
that it might in the future want to incorporate by reference is still not going to
feel the same pressures to be accurate and complete as it would have felt
preparing a traditional Securities Act registration statement prior to short form
and shelf registration.7
One way to make ourselves happy with the current half-filled glass is to
look at it with an optimistic attitude. Another, better way is to make the glass
all full. To do so, we should establish a system of liability that creates
incentives for established public issuers to provide disclosure in their periodic
4. If an Exchange Act filing has a material misstatement or omission, a plaintiff seeking to
recover damages must sue under either the Exchange Act's Rule 1Ob-5 (which requires the plaintiff to
show scienter and often reaches only the issuer) or section 18 (which has been interpreted as requiring
the plaintiff to show actual "eyeball" reliance on the filed document). See Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co.,
607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979)). She thus has much less chance of success than if the same statement
appears in a registration statement under the Securities Act, which, among other things, imposes,
pursuant to section 11, absolute liability on the issuer and, subject to an affirmative due diligence
defense, on the issuer's directors, top officers and underwriters as well.
5. Nothing under the liability scheme traditionally applicable to Exchange Act filings would
prompt such a review.
6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7. In many, if not most cases, no underwriter will participate in the drafting of an issuer's
periodic filing. An investment bank, not knowing whether it will subsequently be an underwriter in a
public offering of the issuer, would generally consider participating in such drafting sessions not worth
the effort. When one does, it will not, for the same reasons as well as for fear of antagonizing a
potential client, be as aggressive in preventing disclosure violations as it would be in a traditional
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filings that is as high quality as they traditionally provided at the time of a
registered public offering prior to short form and shelf registration.
I. THE INEVITABLE COMING PRIMACY OF PERIODIC DISCLOSURE AND
THE NEED TO REDEFINE LIABILITY
The moment is ripe for pressing this proposal. The concept of "company
registration" has again become the focus of debate,9 due in part to the
technological forces that are the subject of this symposium. 0 Under company
registration, an issuer would register just once and thereafter provide updating
information on a continuing basis. Unlike the traditional scheme, the issuer
could then offer and sell securities whenever it wished without the need to
register the securities themselves. We are already moving in the direction of
company registration. Short form and shelf registration, by enabling
established issuers to incorporate by reference disclosures contained in their
periodic filings, make the statement registering the securities a relatively
simple document. The step from less onerous registration to no registration is
not a large one.
Proposals for company registration rest on the relatively limited premise
8. I have been arguing this position for over a decade. See Fox, supra note 3, at 1033-34;
MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 358-67 (1987).
9. See generally, Wallman Report, supra note 3. The idea of company registration traces its
origins back at least as far as a 1966 article by Milton Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966), in which he argues that the combined disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act would have been quite different if they had been enacted in
reverse order. Cohen argues that the base of the disclosure system should be Exchange Act periodic
disclosure. Id. at 1366-67. The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code represented
an early effort to implement the idea of company disclosure. Federal Securities Code (Am. Law Inst.)
(1980). See also Statement Concerning Codification of Federal Securities Laws, Securities Act Rel.
6377 (Jan. 21, 1982).
10. As Professor Cox points out, the technological forces that are the subject of this symposium
are leading issuers to engage in more frequent, smaller share offerings instead of in occasional large
offerings. James D. Cox, The Fundamentals of an Electronically-Based Federal Securities Act, 75
Wash. U. L.Q. 857, 859 (1997). These forces raise the possibility that, absent current regulation, the
efficient way to raise capital would be almost continuous sales. Established issuers not in need of the
reputational validation of a quality underwriter might be able to do without an underwriter's marketing
services as well. They might be able to post on the Internet daily offerings of stock in amounts very
small relative to a traditional public offering. There are other reasons as well why company registration
has come to the forefront, the same ones that Dean Seligman cites as the reasons for the occurrence of
the reforms that have resulted in the decline in the quality of new issue disclosure. Seligman, supra
note 1, at 896-98. These include the incorporation of some basic principles of modem financial
economics into the conventional understanding of persons concerned with securities law issues and the
politics of deregulation generally.
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that the market is "informationally" efficient with respect to the kinds of
information contained in periodic disclosure filings. As soon as the filing
occurs, the issuer's security price "fully reflects" the filed information as if
everyone in the market knows it." Given this widely accepted premise,
company rather than security registration is just plain common sense, at least
in the case of a new issue offering of an existing class of securities already
actively trading in the secondary market. 2 The actual giving of information to
each prospective investor, which is at the heart of securities registration, will
not influence the price at which the shares can be sold.
The difficult issue is not whether we should move to company
11. There is a large body of financial economics literature that evaluates the market reaction to
the affirmative public announcement of various kinds of important events affecting particular issuers.
For a classic review, see KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 249-59 (1982). The typical such
"event study" involves a large number of issuers, each of which has experienced at one time or another
the announcement of a particular kind of important event, for example, a stock split. The studies show
that the shares of the affected firms as a group experience statistically significant abnormal returns at
the time of the announcement and, starting almost immediately thereafter, normal returns for the
duration of the study, which is sometimes as long as several years. Thus, while some issuers' share
prices go up in the periods following the announcement (compared to the market as a whole) and
others go down, the average change is near zero. This suggests that as information diffuses out to a
larger and larger number of investors, the price on average does not change. Thus the initial price
reaction is on average the same "as if" this larger group of investors also knew the information from
the beginning. The announcements of events tested in this fashion are similar in kind to the types of
information contained in Exchange Act filings.
This limited claim of market efficiency is all that is necessary for company registration to make
sense because it suggests that actually giving information to each prospective investor will not
influence the price at which investors buy. Thus the case for company registration does not require the
stronger claim that a publicly traded security's price is "fundamental value" efficient in the sense that
it is the best estimate, based on publicly available information, of the discounted present value of the
cash flow that will accrue to the security's holder. There is greater skepticism about the fundamental
value efficiency of share prices. See Fox, supra note 8, at 57-59; Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A.
Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761
(1985); Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992); Andrei Schliefer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader
Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSp. 19 (1990); William Y.S. Wang, The "Contemperaneous"
Traders Who Can Sue an Insider Trader, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1987).
Professor Cox is concerned that this skepticism undermines arguments for company registration
based on market efficiency" He instead rests his support for company registration on the capacity of the
Internet and the World Wide Web to permit the implications of an issuer's Exchange Act filings to
reach investors through a process of "filtration" involving securities professionals and the advice of
individual brokers. Cox, supra note 10, at 13-26. The analysis above suggests that his concerns about
reliance on an efficient market based justification for company registration are exaggerated and
unnecessarily force him to a justification that is in fact more problematic.
12. This paper concerns only the liability rules for this kind of offering. The efficient market
hypothesis does not justify, for example, a company registration system for an initial public offering




registration. We should and we will. It is how to structure liability for
materially false, misleading or incomplete disclosures in a company's
periodic filings: who should pay whom under what circumstances. In
particular, should such a disclosure violation give rise to greater liability if the
issuer sells new securities prior to the time that the market becomes informed
of the true situation than if the issuer does not sell any securities.
Commentators have only begun to think seriously about the liability issue, 3
which makes Professor Cox's contribution to this symposium at the "cutting
edge."' 4 Our thinking can be improved, however, by revisiting the question of
what are the social gains from issuer disclosure. Therefore, I am going to
consider first why these gains are as important when an issuer is not offering
securities as when it is. I then provide a preliminary sketch of what, in light of
the answer to this question, would be the best structure of liability.
II. BAD AND GOOD REASONS WHY HIGH QUALITY DISCLOSURE
Is As IMPORTANT WHEN AN ISSUER IS NOT OFFERING
SECURITIES As WHEN IT IS
A. The need for investor protection in the secondary market is not a good
reason
A common argument for improving the quality of periodic disclosure is
that buyers in the secondary market are in just as much need of the protection
from such disclosure as buyers in the primary market In fact, the argument
goes, the traditional emphasis on primary market disclosure is particularly
misplaced because far more trades occur each year in the secondary market
than in the primary market.'5 This is not a good argument Investor protection,
while a worthy goal of securities legislation in its regulation of many kinds of
behavior, is not a persuasive justification for the affirmative regulation of
issuer disclosure.'6 Disclosure is not necessary to protect investors against
either unfair prices or risk.
13. Wallman Report, supra note 3, at 39-47; Letter from the American Bar Association Section
on Business Law Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities 8, 29-30 (Dec. 11, 1996) (responding
to the SEC request for comments pursuant to Release 33-7314) (copy on file with the author).
14. See generally Cox, supra note 10.
15. Cox, supra note 10, at 13-26.
16. I have discussed this point in considerably more detail elsewhere. Merritt B. Fox, Securities
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. _ (forthcoming
1997) (Part HAl).
19971
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSTY LAW QUARTERLY
To see why, first consider unfair prices. Under the efficient market
hypothesis, securities prices are unbiased whether there is a great deal of
information available about an issuer or very little.'7 In other words, share
prices will on average equal the actual value of the shares involved whether
issuers are required to produce a lot of disclosure or only a little. Thus, greater
disclosure is not necessary to protect investors from buying their shares at
prices that are, on average, unfair, i.e., greater than their actual values.' 8
Now consider risk. It is true that with less information available about an
issuer, share price, while still unbiased, is less accurate, i.e., it is more likely
to be significantly off one way or the other from the share's actual value. If an
investor has a less than fully diversified portfolio, greater share price
inaccuracy can make the portfolio more risky. High quality disclosure would,
to some extent, protect such an investor by reducing this risk. The investor,
however, can protect himself much more effectively and at less social cost by
simply diversifying more.'9
B. Efficiency Enhancement is a Good Reason
A second, much stronger argument for high quality periodic disclosure is
that it improves how proposed new investment projects in the economy are
selected for implementation and the way existing projects are operated.2" This
improvement occurs through disclosure's effects on three of the economy's
17. Empirical work showing unbiased reactions to announcements of corporate information, see
supra note 11, suggests that the market is unbiased as well to issuer absences of comment about certain
matters.
18. For an analysis of why the noise theory critique of the efficient market hypothesis still does
not create a strong fairness justification for mandatory disclosure, see Fox, supra note 16, at Part
II.A.1.
19. In portfolio theory terms, issuer disclosure reduces firm specific ("unsystematic") risk. Firm
specific risk can be completely eliminated by sufficient diversification. See generally Banoff, supra
note 3.
20. 1 have discussed this point in more detail elsewhere. See Fox, supra note 3, at 1017-25. See
also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J.
977 (1992). For other perspectives on the efficiency enhancing features of securities disclosure, see
Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763 (1995)
(arguing that while regulators chase the goal of accuracy enhancement, the laws enacted under this
banner actually work to reduce the flow of information relevant to accurate pricing of securities); Paul
G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. Rv. 1047
(1995) (arguing that the goal of disclosure should be focused on and limited to helping investors
uncover breaches of contractual or fiduciary obligations); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613
(1988) (disputing the premise that an efficient market is able to monitor or structure the allocation of




key control mechanisms: the market for corporate control, share price based
managerial compensation and the cost of capital. It occurs whether or not the
issuer is offering new securities for sale.
1. The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is a well recognized device for limiting
the agency costs of management where ownership is separated from control,
as in the typical publicly held corporation. More information and the resulting
increase in price accuracy improves the control market's effectiveness in
performing this role. A potential acquiror, in deciding whether it is worth
paying what it would need to pay to acquire a target it feels is mismanaged,
must make an assessment of what the target would be worth in the acquiror's
hands. This assessment is inherently risky and acquiror management is likely
to be risk averse. Greater disclosure, however, reduces the riskiness of this
assessment. Hence, with greater disclosure, a smaller apparent deviation
between incumbent management decisionmaking and what would maximize
share value is needed to propel a potential acquiror into action.
Also, when share price is inaccurately high, even the potential acquiror
who believes for sure that it can run the target better than incumbent
management may find the target not worth paying for. The increase in share
price accuracy that results from greater disclosure reduces the chance that this
will happen.
Thus, greater disclosure makes the hostile takeover threat more real.
Incumbent managers will be less tempted to implement negative net present
value projects that maintain or enlarge their empires or to operate existing
projects in ways that sacrifice profits to satisfy their personal aims. And those
that do do these things are more likely to be replaced.
2. Share Price Based Managerial Compensation
Greater disclosure can reduce the agency cost of management in a second
way: by increasing the use of share price based managerial compensation.21
21. Share price based compensation is an affirmative way to better align the interests of
management with those of shareholders. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO
Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138. A
critical review of the literature advocating greater share price based compensation for management can
be found in Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified
Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2096-106 (1994).
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The problem with share price based compensation is risk.22 Managers, being
risk averse, will not want all of their compensation in share price based
form.' More accurate share prices make such compensation less risky,
however. As a result, managers, when offered a total compensation package
with a given expected value, will be willing to take a larger portion in share
price based form.
3. Capital Allocation
Finally, increased share price accuracy can improve the selection of
proposed new investment projects in the economy as well through a more
direct effect on the investment behavior of individual firms than the forces
discussed above. This is obvious when the project under consideration would
be financed with a stock sale. What is important here, however, is that share
price can have similar effect even when the firm would finance the project
some other way. On the supply side, share price can affect the cost of a
project by affecting the terms at which intermediaries are willing to extend
the firm alternative forms of external financing.24 On the demand side, share
price can affect management's willingness to use funds to implement a new
project. Share price can affect management's willingness to use debt
financing because the firm may feel the need to counterbalance any new debt
with a subsequent new equity financing in order to maintain its optimal
debt/equity ratio.' More generally, because of concern with public
22. Job compensation is a large part of the typical manager's annual income. Therefore the risk
associated from receiving part or all of it in share price based form, though firm specific, cannot be
diversified away.
23. There is empirical evidence to support the proposition that a reduction in the riskiness of an
issuer's stock will increase the proportion of compensation a manager will be willing to take in stock
price based form. Randall Kroszner compares the percentage of shares owned by officers and directors
in a representative sample of exchange-listed U.S. firms in 1935 and one in 1995 and finds that it
increased from 13% to 22%. He finds that the relationship between ownership and performance is very
similar in the two periods and that the most promising explanation of the change is the reduction in
stock price volatility between the first and second periods. Randall Kroszner, Were the Good Old Days
that Good?: Evolution of Managerial Stock Ownership and Corporate Governance Since the Great
Depression (Oct. 8, 1996) (unpublished paper presented at the University of Michigan Department of
Economics History Seminar) (on file with author).
24. HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A
PURPOSE 123 (1979).
25. Some financial theorists, of course, suggest that there is no optimal debt/equity ratio. For the
classic statement of this view, see Franco Modilgiani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). The more




perceptions, low share price can constrain use of both external and internal
funds. 26 Putting these supply and demand factors together, if share price is
inaccurately low, management may decide not to pursue relatively promising
proposed investment projects. Alternatively, if it is inaccurately high, it may
implement relatively unpromising proposed projects. Greater disclosure,
through its enhancement of price accuracy, limits this problem.
C. Avoiding Financing Distortions is a Good Reason
A third, also much stronger argument for raising the quality of periodic
disclosure to that required when new securities are issued is that doing so will
eliminate existing distortions in the choice of funding sources. The higher
quality disclosure prompted by a new securities offering involves producing
information that managers would rather not produce. This is the reason
disclosure needs to be mandated. Managers can avoid this displeasure (as
well as registration's out of pocket costs for the legal assistance and document
printing) by raising funds for investment in a way that does not require
registration.
Professor Cox points out one of these distortions: if external finance is
used, there is an incentive to choose a form that does not require registration,
for example, a private placement, a sale into the Rule 144A market or a sale
abroad under Regulation S. The firm (and society) pay a cost for these "back
alley" forms of financing, however, because the sale price the firm receives
reflects a discount for the fact that these securities typically have restrictions
on resale and trade in markets with inferior liquidity.27 Accompanying social
costs of a system requiring securities registration but providing exemptions
are the legal resources devoted to determining whether the issuer is entitled to
an exemption and the administrative resources devoted to assuring
compliance with necessary procedures."
much. Too little debt deprives a firm of its tax deductible interest payments. Too much debt leads to
increased agency costs because of the resulting increased divergence between the interests of debt and
equity. It also increases the likelihood of bankruptcy, which would involve real costs. For an overview
of these points and the responses of the adherents of financial structure irrelevance, see RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 447-66 (5th ed. 1996).
26. See Fox, supra note 8, at 282-87.
27. Cox, supra note 10.
28. Letter from the American Bar Association Sections on Business Law Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, supra note 13.
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A second, less recognized distortion from transaction triggered disclosure
is the incentive it creates for using internal rather than external finance. By
using internal funds, management can avoid unwanted disclosure without
enduring illiquidity discounts associated with non-registered external finance.
This is an unfortunate distortion because by avoiding outside finance,
managers avoid subjecting their real investment choices to the discipline and
scrutiny of the market 29 There is evidence that the investment projects chosen
by finns relying predominantly on internal finance are considerably inferior
to those chosen by other firms, an inefficiency which significantly damages
the economy's growth in productivity.30
The hostile takeover activity of the late 1980s can be seen as a reaction to
this problem. This activity was concentrated in industries where firms had
large "free cash flows."' In such cases, often the acquiror's objective was to
undertake a leveraged financial restructuring of the target in order to increase
the payout of cash flow to the market. Alternatively, the acquiror sought to
"bust up" the target by separating into different corporations operations
producing high cash flows from operations into which these cash flows were
being inadvisedly poured.32 The hostile takeover boom may have partially
corrected the problem of suboptimal projects funded by internal funds, but it
entailed enormous transaction costs. Furthermore, with the subsequent spate
of state anti-takeover statutes, hostile takeovers may be less effective at
continuing to play this role today. Removing one of the incentives for internal
finance by eliminating the difference between the disclosure level entailed in
using internal finance and that entailed in using external finance could help
reduce the problem and would be less expensive than hostile takeovers.
29. See FOX, supra note 8, at 132-40; Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of
Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650,654 (Sept 1984).
30. See, e.g., GORDON DONALDSON, CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY (1961); William J. Baumol et
al., Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REv. ECON. & STAT. 345 (1970).
For a critical review of these and several other studies, as well as an estimate of the magnitude of the
effects on the economy, see Fox, supra note 8, at 233-37.
31. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REv. 323 (May 1986).
32. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The




III. A LIABILITY SYSTEM To ASSURE THAT WHEN AN ISSUER Is NOT
OFFERING SECURITIES, ITS DISCLOSURE Is As HIGH QUALITY As IT WAS
TRADITIONALLY WHEN AN ISSUER WAS OFFERING SECURITIES
The liability scheme that I am proposing would apply to established,
publicly traded issuers of the kind that now qualify to use Form S-3. It
contemplates a company registration type system of disclosure filings. The
issuers would continue to provide periodic disclosure on the annual Form 10-
K, the quarterly form 10-Q, and the "current report" form 8-K. Any time an
issuer offers some additional securities, it would need to file with the SEC,
twenty-four hours in advance of the offering, a notice of its intent to make the
offer (a "notice of offer") that discloses any material changes since its last 10-
K not disclosed in a subsequent 10-Q or 8-K.33
The 10-K, in addition to being signed by the top executives and a majority
of directors, would be signed by a "certifying," financially sound investment
bank. In doing so, the bank would associate itself with the filing in the same
way as an underwriter in a traditional registered offering.34 To avoid liability
should the 10-K turn out to contain a disclosure violation, the investment
bank would need to conduct the same kind of due diligence investigation
concerning the truthfulness and completeness of the 10-K as it traditionally
conducted as an underwriter in a registered public offering. In return, the bank
would obviously expect to receive a fee. With this type of investment banker
motivation, the 10-K would typically contain the same high quality disclosure
as did the traditional registration statements.
The question of who would be liable, and for how much, if disclosure
violations occurred in any of the issuer's disclosure documents-the 10-K,
10-Q, 8-Q and the notice of offer-is obviously quite complicated. What is
set out below is a brief, first cut at this question.
33. This requirement would require disclosure of the same updating information that currently
must be disclosed in a shelf registration prospectus. See Adoption on Integrated Disclosure Systems,
Securities Act Release No. 6383, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328
(Mar. 3, 1982).
34. For the top few hundred largest corporations, there might be a requirement that a certifying
investment bank sign the quarterly 10-Q's as well. The argument for such a requirement would be that
disclosure involves economies of scale. The benefits grow proportionally with the size of the issuer
making the disclosures, but the costs rise more slowly with size. If this special requirement for the
largest issuers were adopted, the same kinds of liability that would be imposed on the certifying bank
for a disclosure violation in a 10-K of an ordinary issuer would be imposed for disclosure violations in
these largest issuer's I0-Q's as well.
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A. A Disclosure Violation When A Sale of Securities Occurs
In the reformed liability system of the new era, the issuer's sale of
securities at the time that an uncorrected "disclosure violation"'35 exists
should, as under Section 11, make the issuer absolutely liable in an amount
equal to the increase in the offering price resulting from the violation.36 The
fact that a sale occurred should not affect the directors', officers' or certifying
investment banker's liability for the violation, which is discussed in the next
section.
Imposing liability on the issuer in this fashion is contrary to the
recommendations of Professor Cox in his contribution to this symposium."
And it may seem contradictory as part of a larger plan to reform the old
system's special emphasis on disclosure at the time securities are issued.
Closer consideration of the point, however, reveals that there is no such
contradiction. Issuer liability in this situation simply returns what would
otherwise be a special gain for issuing securities while the price is inflated
due to a disclosure violation. It does not create an incentive to provide higher
than usual quality disclosure at the time of such a sale; it is an antidote for
what would otherwise be an incentive to provide lower than usual quality
disclosure at such a time.
From this, it should be clear that continuing to impose liability on the
issuer will not distort the choice between internal and external finance. As
long as all issuer sales of securities are subject to liability, issuer liability also
will not distort the choice among potential offerees and methods of offering.
Offerings to just a few investors, only to institutional investors or only abroad
35. A "disclosure violation" would exist if the issuer's most recent 10-K, its most recent
subsequent 10-Q or 8-K (if either were required) or its updating notice of offering contains, as of the
notice's filing date, an uncorrected materially false or misleading statement or omission of a material
fact required to be stated therein.
36. The measure of damages under Section 1 l(e) appears to be an attempt to achieve an easily
administrable approximation of this amount. For a security purchased at the time of offering and
retained until the time ofjudgment, the plaintiff, by submitting into evidence the offering price and the
price the day the suit was brought, establishes a prima facie case for damages of that amount. The
defendant can rebut this by showing that the market price of the security at the time the suit is less than
its actual value (the actual language of the statute refers to "the value thereof at the time the suit was
brought") or by affirmatively showing that some or all decline in price was due to factors other than
the disclosure violation. In essence, the drop in price between the time of offering and the time of suit
(when the truth would be out), is a crude market measure of the amount by which the disclosure
violation inflated the offering price, which the defendant can refine if it can introduce convincing
evidence of other factors responsible for part or all of the decline.




would rest on their own economic merits, not on their ability to provide a
means to avoid quality disclosure. Inclusion of such transactions is clearly
called for once it is understood that the function of mandatory disclosure is
efficiency-improved selection of the proposed new investment projects in
the economy and improved operation of existing ones-not investor
protection."
While, as discussed below, directors, officers and certifying investment
bankers should be exposed to a certain amount of liability when a disclosure
violation occurs, the amount should not be affected by whether the issuer sold
securities or not.39 Admittedly, these actors might receive a derivative
advantage from the inflated price the issuer enjoys when a disclosure
violation exists at the time it is selling securities. This is not a strong reason to
impose liability on these actors when absent a sale we would not, however,
because the issuer would still have to give up its gains under my proposal.
Beyond this derivative advantage, for which my proposal corrects, these other
actors have no more incentive to countenance an issuer disclosure violation at
the time the issuer is selling securities than at any other time.
B. A Disclosure Violation When No Sale of Securities Occurs
As just noted, a disclosure violation, whether or not a sale of securities
occurs, should trigger imposition of liability on the directors, officers and
certifying investment bankers. The liability would be subject to a due
diligence defense. It should be limited in amount and should be payable to the
issuer. The issuer should not be liable to anyone for a violation if it has sold
no securities.
The object of the proposed liability system is to make directors, officers
and, most importantly, the certifying investment bank feel the same legal
incentives to make the issuer's 10-K free of disclosure violations as they
traditionally felt with respect to an issuer's registration statement. This can be
accomplished by exposing each of them to the same risk of liability in the
same amount as they would have faced in a traditional registered
38. The Wallman Report's recommendations would impose section 11 on these previously
exempt transactions also. Because the Report leaves unexamined the orthodox, but flawed investor
protection rationale for mandatory disclosure, however, it has trouble explaining why transactions
where that protection is not really needed should still give rise to issuer liability. See generally
Wallman Report, supra note 3.
39. This statement applies only to liability under the mandatory disclosure regime, not the anti-
fraud rules.
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underwriting if they had exercised the same amount of due diligence.
More specifically, the 10-K can be treated as if it were a registration
statement for an offering on the date of filing in an amount, call it I, equal to
the issuer's total amount of real investment and increase in non-liquid assets
during the preceeding year. To establish what each individual actor's liability
would be, we need to establish a concept of "total liability," which would be
the total amount of damages under section 11(e) of the Securities Act if the
10-K were a registration statement to sell $1 in shares. In that case, a plaintiff
suing on behalf of all purchasers in this imaginary offering who could
establish a disclosure violation would establish a prima facie case for
damages equal to
I x [(P -P1)/Po]
where P. is the market price of the issuer's shares on the 10-K's filing date
and P, is the market price at the time the suit is brought. The bulk of these
damages in the case of a real registration statement would be borne by the
issuer. Each director, signing officer and certifying investment bank in such a
case would only have liability to the extent of their required contributions.
Under my reform proposal these persons' potential liabilities for a disclosure
violation in the 10-K would be the same as their required contributions in the
case of a real registration statement They could free themsevles of this
potential liability by engaging in acts that would enable them to show, if a
suit should arise after the filing, that after reasonable investigation at the time
of the filing, they had reason to believe and did believe the 10-K contained no
disclosure violations.
A suit against an officer, director or certifying investment bank could be
brought under these provisions by any shareholder on behalf of the
corporation in much the same fashion that a shareholder can now bring a suit
to recover short swing profits under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.
Attorney's fees would be available for successful plaintiffs, as under section
16(b) °
Two questions may stand out in the reader's mind after reviewing this
proposal. The first is why choose the firm's total investment for a year, I, as
the amount of the phantom offering from which officer, director and
underwriter liability is calculated. The answer is that whether a firm uses
external or internal funds to finance its investments, it ought to expose itself




to the scrutiny of the mandatory disclosure process in proportion to the total
amount of such investments. This is especially so given the poor investment
record of firms that rely primarily on internally generated funds. Also, total
investment is a rough measure of firm size and the absolute value of the gains
from a given improvement in the alignment of the interests of management
and shareholders should also be roughly proportional to firm size. The larger
the firm, the larger the gain from a realignment. That in turn justifies a
proportionally greater amount of resources devoted to due diligence. Larger
potential liability will prompt that greater amount of due diligence.
The other question is why should the issuer not be liable for a disclosure
violation if it sells no securities. In this situation, the effect of the violation on
investors trading in the secondary market is a zero-sum game. There are
winners as well as losers and the winners' winnings just equal the losers'
losses. Each winner and loser is in that position by reason of chance and is
just as likely to be in the opposite position as the result of disclosure
violations by other issuers. For the typical diversified investor, and even for
the non-diversified investor who buys and sells different stocks over time, her
aggregate experience with disclosure violations is likely to be a wash. If the
losers have a cause of action against the issuer, it will be paid for by the
shareholders at the time the suit is brought, passing on the losses from one
chance group to another. There seems little justification for such a
redistribution, particularly given the high transaction costs associated with
securities litigation, other than its deterrence value in motivating management
to be more careful in preventing disclosure violations. The proposed liability
scheme already does that far more effectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
We are moving toward a world in which periodic disclosure will be the
primary focus of the system and little or no additional disclosure will be
required of issuers at the time securities are offered and sold. This should
prompt us to rethink our system of liability for disclosure violations, which is
based on our historical disclosure system with its opposite emphasis.
Rethinking liability intelligently requires us to reexamine what are the
social benefits from mandatory issuer disclosure when an issuer is not selling
securities. Modem financial economics provides a guide not available to an
earlier generation. Contrary to popular belief, protecting investors against
unfair prices or against risk are not persuasive reasons for mandatory
disclosure. Improving how proposed new investment projects in the economy
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are selected for implementation and the way existing projects are operated is a
persuasive reason. Another persuasive reason is eliminating distortions that
otherwise occur in the choice between internal and external finance and in the
choice among sources of external finance.
High quality issuer disclosure has substantial value all of the time, whether
or not the issuer is selling securities. The current movement toward company
disclosure results in lower quality periodic disclosure than traditionally was
provided in registration statements. To raise the quality of periodic disclosure
to that benchmark requires putting new pressures on issuers to avoid
disclosure violations when they make their periodic filings. This can be
accomplished by involving an investment bank and the officers and directors
of the issuer in the drafting of the annual 10-K periodic disclosure filings.
Liability would be imposed on each of these actors to give them the same
incentives as they had in the traditional registered offering to make the filing
free from disclosure violations.
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